cept of his aesthetics. The concept of the play-drive is the very foundation of the whole system of aesthetics developed in that work. In this paper, I will call Schiller's play-drive the aesthetic instinct 2) . In my view,
Schiller's concept of the aesthetic instinct in the Aesthetic Education has two features. On the one hand, it could be developed into a fundamental concept of aesthetics that could shed a new light on various important aesthetic topics. On the other hand, it has its own difficulties that should be overcome before it can become a trulyfundamental concept of aesthetics.
It is the aim of this paper to clarify the phenomenological concept of the aesthetic instinct and to sketch the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct that has its basis on concrete aesthetic experience. In section 1, I will delineate Schiller's concept of the aesthetic instinct introduced in the Aesthetic Education. In section 2, I will assess Schiller's concept of the aesthetic instinct and in section 3, I will give a brief sketch of the phenomenological concept of the aesthetic instinct.
Schiller's concept of the aesthetic instinct
Schiller considers the aesthetic instinct to be the origin of art. Art is the result of the working of the aesthetic instinct, an instinct that is competent to cope with the total crisis of the mankind as a whole experienced at that time. In order to clarify the structure of the aesthetic instinct, Schiller makes a distinction between "Beauty as Idea" and "beauty in experience"
If we carry out this abstraction to the highest level with respect to the human being, we arrive at "two ultimate concepts" (the Aesthetic Education, 73) as the essential components of man. One of the "two ultimate concepts" in man is "something that endures" and the other of them is "something that constantly changes" (the Aesthetic Education, 73).
"That which endures" in man is "his Person" (Person) and "that which changes" is "his Condition" (Zustand) (the Aesthetic Education, 73). The
Person and the Condition are two principles that constitute human being.
At this point, it is important to pay attention to the fact that they are two principles that conflict with each other endlessly. "The Person, which manifests itself in the eternally persisting 'I', and only in this, cannot become, cannot have a beginning in time" (the Aesthetic Education, 75), whereas "every Condition, […] every determinate existence, has its origins in time" (the Aesthetic Education, 75). In Eleventh Letter, Schiller calls the Condition in man "the material", "the matter", "the formless content", "the sensuous", "the world" or "the reality", whereas he calls the Person in man "the law" (das Gesetz), "the disposition to the divine" (die Anlage zu der Gottheit) or "the form".
Since man is composed of two different principles in his real life, man is confronted with two contrary tasks. On the one hand, man is faced with the task of being faithful to his Condition. This task "insists upon absolute reality: he is to turn everything which is mere form into world, and make all his potentialities fully manifest." (the Aesthetic Education, 77) On the other hand, man is faced with the task of being faithful to his Person. This task "insists upon absolute formality: he is to destroy everything in him-self which is mere world, and bring harmony into all his changes." (the Aesthetic Education, 77)
Man is unable to fulfill these two tasks, if he does not have "two opposing forces which, since they drive us to the realization of their object, may aptly be termed instincts" (the Aesthetic Education, 79) 3) . One of the two instincts that Schiller introduces as one of the central concepts of his aesthetics is the sensuous instinct that "proceeds from the physical existence of man, or his sensuous nature." (the Aesthetic Education, 79) "Its business is to set him within the limits of time, and to turn him into matter" and "by matter in this context we understand nothing more than change, or reality which occupies time." (the Aesthetic Education, 79) The other instinct is "the formal instinct" that "proceeds from the absolute existence of man, or from his rational nature, and is intent on giving him the freedom to bring harmony into the diversity of his manifestations, and to affirm his Person among all his changes of Condition." (the Aesthetic Education, 81)
Schiller considers the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct to be the two fundamental instincts of man. It is "these two instincts which […] exhaust our concept of humanity" and there is not "a third fundamental instinct which might possibly reconcile the two" (the Aesthetic Education, 85). The non-existence of "a third fundamental instinct", however, does not imply that there is no other instinct in man than these two. If there is no other instinct in man except them, "the unity of human nature"
3) E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby translate "Trieb" into drive, but I translate it into "instinct".
would be utterly destroyed by the "primary and radical opposition" (the Aesthetic Education, 85) of these two fundamental instincts.
Thus, there must be a third instinct that is supposed to restore "the unity of human nature" and it is none other than "the play-drive" or "the play-instinct" (Spieltrieb), the central concept of the Aesthetic Education.
The play-instinct is the genetic product of the "reciprocal action" (the Aesthetic Education, 95) between the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct. Originally, these two instincts do not act reciprocally, since by their own natures, they are not in need of contact. "The sensuous instinct does indeed demand change; but it does not demand the extension of this to the Person and its domain, does not demand a change of principles. The formal instinct insists on unity and persistence -but it does not require the Condition to be stabilized as well as the Person does not require identity of sensation. The two are, therefore, not by nature opposed […] ." (the Aesthetic Education, 85) But if we take a look at their operation in concrete situations, we cannot deny "that their tendencies do indeed conflict with each other" (the Aesthetic Education, 85). What is then the reason that they conflict with each other? It is "through a wanton transgression of Nature, through mistaking their nature and function, and confusing their spheres of operation" (the Aesthetic Education, 85) that they conflict with each other.
"A wanton transgression of Nature" implies that each of the fundamental instincts attempts to extend their power beyond its own sphere and thereby transgresses the sphere of the other fundamental instinct. Thus, the sensuous instinct attempts to go beyond its own sphere and transgresses the sphere of the formal instinct and, in a similar manner, the formal instinct attempts to go beyond its own sphere and thereby transgresses the sphere of the sensuous instinct. What happens then, if there is a transgression of this kind? According to Schiller, there arises "a new instinct which, precisely because the other two instincts co-operate within it, would be opposed to each of them considered separately and could justifiably count as a new instinct." (the Aesthetic Education, 97) As indicated earlier, Schiller calls this new instinct "the play-instinct" and seeks to clarify its identity and its relationship to the other instincts as follows:
"The sense instinct demands that there shall be change and that time shall have a content; the form-instinct demands that time shall be annulled and that there shall be no change. That instinct, therefore, in which both the others work in concert […] , the play-instinct would be directed towards annulling time within time, reconciling becoming with absolute being and change with identity." (the Aesthetic Education, 97)
Every kind of instinct has its own object to which it is directed. What is then the object of the play-instinct? Since the play-instinct is the result of the reciprocal action of the sensuous instinct and the form instinct, we could clarify its object by comparing it with the object of the sensuous instinct and that of the form instinct. "The object of sense-instinct, expressed in a general concept, we call life, in the widest sense of this term: a concept designating all material being and all that is immediately present to the senses. The object of the form-instinct, expressed in a general concept, we call form, both in the figurative and in the literal sense of this word: a concept which includes all the formal qualities of things and all the relations of these to our thinking faculties. The play-instinct as the aesthetic instinct is the basic concept from which the other important concepts of Schiller's aesthetics such as beauty, aesthetic freedom, the aesthetic mood, the aesthetic feeling, play, appearance (der Schein), the aesthetic state etc. could be deduced. Let us take a look at the connection between the play-instinct and some of the other concepts of Schiller's aesthetics.
As discussed above, beauty as the object of the play-instinct is defined as living form, since it is the product of the reciprocal action of the sensuous instinct that has life as its object and the formal instinct that has the form as its object. After defining the concept of beauty, Schiller introduces two distinctions between two concepts of beauty.
The first one is the distinction mentioned above between "Beauty as Idea and beauty in experience" (the Aesthetic Education, 111). In this respect, it should be noted that the play-instinct as the result of the reciprocal action between the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct could have different modes of operation. In an ideal case, it could operate in the way that the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct as its two components could act with perfect balance and harmony. Except this ideal case, there are endlessly many cases in which the two instincts do act reciprocally in an unbalanced and unharmonious manner. For instance, the sensuous instinct sometimes could take precedence over the formal instinct, and vice-versa. Furthermore, in an ideal case, the play-instinct has "Beauty as Idea" as its object, whereas in the other cases, it has "the beauty in experience" as its object. In contrast to this, in normal cases, when the play-instinct does work, we do not experience "Beauty as Idea", but only "the beauty in experience".
The second one is the distinction between "melting beauty" (die auflösende Schönheit) and the "energizing beauty" (die energische Schönheit) (the Aesthetic Education, 119). In this respect, it should be noted "that we must expect from beauty at once a releasing and a tensing effect: a releasing effect in order to keep both the sense-instinct and the form-instinct within proper bounds; a tensing effect, in order to keep both at full strength." (the Aesthetic Education, 111) The releasing effect is the work of melting beauty, whereas the tensing effect is the work of energizing beauty. Melting beauty and tensing beauty are not two unrelated things.
Rather, they are two sides of the same coin that is called beauty. They always go hand in hand, as Schiller describes them in the following way:
"Ideally speaking, however, these two effects must be reducible to a single effect. Beauty is to release by tensing both natures uniformly, and to tense by releasing both natures uniformly. This already follows from the concept of a reciprocal action, by virtue of which both factors necessarily condition each other and are at the same time conditioned by each other, and the purest product of which is beauty."(the Aesthetic Education, 111)
In this way, the play-instinct is the origin of freedom because freedom is concretely understood as freedom from "compulsion (Zwang)" (the Aesthetic Education, 119) as the state of being tense. We could call a man tense "when he is under the compulsion of thought, no less than when he is under the compulsion of feeling. Exclusive domination by either of his two basic instincts is for him a state of constraint and violence […] ." (the Aesthetic Education, 119) The sensuous instinct and the formal instinct compel man to do something and, in this way, make him tense. It is only the play-instinct that could make man free from "the compulsion of thought" as well as from "the compulsion of feeling". From this standpoint, it is clear that "freedom lies only in the co-operation of both his natures.
The man one-sidedly dominated by feeling, or the sensuously tensed man, will be released and set free by means of form; the man one-sidedly dominated by law, or the spiritually tensed man, will be released and set free by means of matter." (the Aesthetic Education, 119) It should be noted that the freedom that has its origin in the play-instinct is produced by melting beauty that makes man free from feeling as well as from law. "In order to be adequate to this twofold task, melting beauty will therefore reveal herself under two different guises. First, as tranquil form, she will assuage the violence of life, and pave the way which leads from sensation to thought. Secondly, as living image, she will arm abstract form with sensuous power, lead concept back to intuition, and law back to feeling." (the Aesthetic Education, 119-121) Since the freedom is produced by the melting beauty, it is called "aesthetic freedom" (the Aesthetic Education, 143).
Needless to say, what Schiller means by aesthetic freedom is different from
the moral freedom in the Kantian sense. Viewed from the aesthetic point of view, moral freedom in the Kantian sense is not freedom, but a compulsion that has its origin in the formal instinct. Man should be also free from moral freedom through the aesthetic instinct.
The state in which "the aesthetic freedom" prevails is called "the aesthetic State" (the Aesthetic Education, 215). It is distinguished from "the dynamic State" as the State of the savages as well as from "the ethical State of duties" as the State of the barbarians. In "the dynamic State", "it is as force that one man encounters another, and imposes limits upon his activities" and, in "the ethical State of duties," "man sets himself over against man with all the majesty of the law, and puts a curb upon his desires" (the Aesthetic Education, 215). In the aesthetic State, "none may appear to the other except as form, or confront him except as an object of free play. To bestow freedom by means of freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom." (the Aesthetic Education, 215)
The aesthetic State is the final stage in the development of mankind.
There is no harmony, but only conflict among the individuals in the dynamic State as well as in the ethical State. In contrast to these states, in the aesthetic State, there is no conflict, but harmony among the individuals. In this context, the following three points should be noted:
first, that "taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the individual" (the Aesthetic Education, 215), second, that "only the aesthetic mode of perception makes of him [man] a whole, because both his natures must be in harmony, if he is to achieve it" (the Aesthetic Education, 215), third, that "only the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is common to all" (the Aesthetic Education, 215). It is a State of equality in which "no privilege, no autocracy of any kind, is tolerated" (the Aesthetic Education, 217).
"Here, therefore, in the realm of Aesthetic Semblance, we find that ideal of equality fulfilled […] ." (the Aesthetic Education, 219) Thus, the aesthetic State as a State in which harmony, unification and equality prevail is a State in which man as an individual as well as a genus is happy.
"Beauty alone makes the whole happy, and each and every being forgets its limitations while under its spell." (the Aesthetic Education, 217)
Schiller's Theory of the Aesthetic Instinct as a Mixture of Dogmatic Metaphysics and the Phenomenology of Aesthetic Instinct
I will now assess Schiller's theory of the aesthetic instinct summarized in section 1. In my view, on the one hand, it contains some difficulties that preclude it from being characterized as the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct, but, on the other hand, it is of great significance for the development of the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct since it is full of phenomenological insights. As will be discussed later, Schiller's theory of the aesthetic instinct that includes these two aspects could be considered to be a mixture of dogmatic metaphysics and the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct. In order to see these two aspects of Schiller's theory of aesthetic instinct, it is important to first point out some of its difficulties.
Schiller's theory of aesthetic instinct has the following methodological difficulty. The method, which Schiller employs to clarify the existence and the structure of aesthetic instinct, is the method of abstraction that he calls "the transcendental way". He claims that the method of abstraction enables us to grasp Person and Condition as the "two ultimate concepts" in man.
These "two ultimate concepts" are the foundation for the existence of the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct as "two fundamental instincts" in man.
The method of abstraction is problematic, since abstraction could be car- In this context, it should be noted that J. G. Fichte does not consider the aesthetic instinct to be derived from the other kinds of instinct. He classifies the basic instincts of man into "the knowledge instinct (der Erkenntnistrieb)", "the practical instinct (der praktische Trieb)" and "the aesthetic instinct (der ästhetische Trieb)" 4) . These three instincts are not reducible to one another and, in this sense, they could be called fundamental rather than derivative. Thus, Fichte does not consider the aesthetic instinct to be a derivative instinct, and he has a different view on the nature of the aesthetic instinct from Schiller.
In my view, Schiller was a little bit hesitant about the issue of whether the aesthetic instinct could be considered to be derivative. In the Aesthetic Educa-tion, there are some passages that seem to support the interpretation of the aesthetic instinct as a fundamental, not derivative one. For example, the following passage from Nineteenth Letter lends support to this interpretation.
"Each of these two primary instincts, from the time it is developed, strives inevitably, and according to its nature, towards satisfaction; but just because both are necessary, and yet strive towards opposite ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and the will maintains perfect freedom between them. It is, then, the will which acts as power (power being the ground of all reality) vis-à -vis both instincts; but neither of these can of itself act as power against the other." (the Aesthetic Education, 135)
Here we have to pay attention to what "the will" in this passage means.
In this passage, the will is described as a power that "maintains perfect freedom" between the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct as "two primary instincts." What is, then, the power that "maintains perfect freedom" between the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct in Schiller's aesthetics? It is nothing other than the aesthetic instinct as the play-instinct between the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct. Thus, "the will" in this passage turns out to be the play-instinct as the aesthetic instinct. What is important in this context is the fact that "the will" as the aesthetic instinct "acts as power (power being the ground of all reality) vis-à-vis both instincts" and that "neither of these [the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct] can of itself act as power against the other". Thus, "the will" as the aesthetic instinct turns out to be the power that acts on or through the other two instincts and thereby makes the reciprocal action between them possible. This implies that the aesthetic instinct is not a derivative instinct, but rather it is one of the fundamental instincts that constitute man.
Even though Schiller's theory of the aesthetic instinct has some difficulties, it is of great significance for the development of the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct, since it is full of important phenomenological insights. Let me give some examples of them.
The first step in developing the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct is to identify the existence of the aesthetic instinct. It should be noted that the concept of the aesthetic instinct may sound somewhat metaphysical and arouse some skepticism with respect to its existence. In this situation,
Schiller's theory of the aesthetic instinct could serve as evidence for the existence of the aesthetic instinct, since it could be interpreted as a theory that is based on the concrete experience of the aesthetic instinct that
Schiller himself possessed as an artist.
Moreover, even though Schiller's theory of aesthetic instinct is abstract due to the method of abstraction it employs, it is, nevertheless, full of concrete phenomenological analyses of the aesthetic instinct.
One of them is the analysis of the noesis-noema structure of the aesthetic instinct. As is well known, phenomenology considers the noesis-noema correlation to be essential to every kind of consciousness, and the aesthetic instinct is no exception. One of the basic characteristics of the aesthetic instinct is that it has the noesis-noema structure. In fact, in the Aesthetic Education, one can ascertain various kinds of the analysis of the noesis-noema structure of the aesthetic instinct. One of them is the analysis of the object of the aesthetic instinct. As discussed above, Schiller maintains that the aesthetic instinct has its own object just as the other kinds of instinct have their own objects. According to him, the aesthetic instinct has Beauty or the living form as its object and, in this respect, it is different not only from the sensuous instinct that has life as its object, but also different from the formal instinct that has form as its object.
Another example of the phenomenological analyses of the aesthetic instinct is the analysis of the mode of the satisfaction of the aesthetic instinct. The original state of instinct is that of starvation as dissatisfaction and instinct strives necessarily towards satisfaction, as Schiller describes with respect to the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct in the Nineteenth Letter: "Each of these two primary instincts, from the time it is developed, strives inevitably, and according to its nature, towards satisfaction […] ." (the Aesthetic Educa-tion,135) In this respect, the aesthetic instinct is no exception. It also strives towards satisfaction. The process of play as a process of aesthetic experience is nothing other than the process in which the aesthetic instinct strives for satisfaction. In fact,
Schiller describes the way to discover Beauty as Idea as a process of satisfying the aesthetic instinct, as a passage from Fifteenth Letter shows:
"The beauty we find in actual existence is precisely what the play-instinct we find in actual existence deserves; but with the ideal of Beauty that is set up by Reason, an ideal of the play-instinct, too, is enjoined upon man, which he must keep before his eyes in all his forms of play. We shall not go far wrong when trying to discover man's ideal of beauty if we inquire how he satisfies his play-instinct." (the Aesthetic Education, 107)
A third example of the phenomenological analyses of the aesthetic instinct is the analysis of the aesthetic world. Every kind of instinct is the origin of the constitution of a specific world. For example, the sensuous instinct is the origin of the constitution of the sensuous world, and the formal instinct is the origin of the constitution of the moral world. In this sense, the aesthetic instinct is no exception, and it is the origin of the constitution of a specific world, namely the aesthetic world. In fact, in Twenty Seventh Letter, employing the concepts of the aesthetic instinct, play and semblance (der Schein), Schiller touches on the issue of the constitution of the aesthetic world as "a third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance" 2) The concept of the aesthetic instinct is not a metaphysical one or a mere theoretical construct that does not have any matter corresponding to it. It is a concept that is founded on the experience of the aesthetic instinct. Here it should be noted that the aesthetic instinct does Schiller's aesthetics is based on the fact that the reciprocal action between the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct is not the work of these two instincts, but the work of the aesthetic instinct itself. This implies that the aesthetic instinct should be already there together with the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct, so that it instigates the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct to act reciprocally.
Thus, the aesthetic instinct should be considered to be a fundamental instinct that is not to be reduced to the other fundamental instinct(s).
In Freud considers the enormoursly strong knowledge-instinct of Leonardo Da Vinci to be a sublimation of "the sexual instinct (der Sexualtrieb)" (104). For him, the sexual instinct many aesthetic experiences that might be interpreted as the result of sublimating the sexual instinct, but it is not the case that every kind of the aesthetic experience can be considered to be the result of the sublimation of the sexual instinct. In this context, it should be noted that the aesthetic instinct might begin to work later than the other instincts, but this does not imply that it is a derivative instinct, whereas these other instincts are fundamental ones.
4) The aesthetic instinct is the beginning of any aesthetic experience such as the aesthetic creation or the aesthetic appreciation. It is the beginning of any aesthetic creation in the sense that an artist who begins creating an artistic work is driven by the aesthetic instinct. It is also the beginning of any aesthetic appreciation in the sense that a person who begins to appreciate a work of art is driven by the aesthetic instinct. In this context, it should be noted that the encounter with a work of art is surely a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for the beginning of the act of appreciating an artwork. The working of the aesthetic instinct is needed for beginning the act of appreciating a work of art on the part of the spectator. In order to understand this fact, one might compare the following two cases with each other. In one case, a person encounters a work of art, but he does not appreciate it as a work of art, but only as an ordinary object of everyday life. In another case, another person encounters the same artwork, but he does appreciate it is the fundamental instinct and the other instincts are derived ones that have their origin in the sexual instinct. In this respect, the aesthetic instinct is no exeception. It is also a derivative instinct that has its origin in the sublimation of the sexual instinct as the fundamental instinct. After the beginning of the first act of the aesthetic experience, the aesthetic experience does not disappear as long as the aesthetic instinct is still present. This implies that the aesthetic instinct is the driving force that keeps the aesthetic experience active. Many aestheticians consider play to be the essence of the aesthetic experience.
Schiller is a typical example for them, and he considers the play of the sensuous instinct and the formal instinct to be the essence of aesthetic experience. As is well known, before Schiller, Kant considered the play between the imagination and the understanding to be the essence of aesthetic experience 6) . I claim that the whole process of the aesthetic experience as a process of playing is the work of aesthetic instinct. So long as the aesthetic instinct continues to work, the aesthetic experience as a process of aesthetic playing continues and at the moment when the aesthetic instinct stops, the aesthetic experience as a process of aesthetic playing also stops. Needless to say, the intensity of the aesthetic experience is dependent on the intensity of the aesthetic instinct. The more intense the aesthetic instinct, the 6) I. Kant(1974) , Kritik der Urteilskraft, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 55 ff. Willoughby translate "das reine ästhetische Gefuhl" into "the purely aesthetic sense" (the Aesthetic Education, 199), but I translate it into "the purely aesthetic feeing". They translate "Stimmung" mainly into "the mode", but I translate it Kant, however, Schiller does not consider the aesthetic feeling to be the final fact that could not be traced further. Rather, he deals with the issue of aesthetic feeling in close connection with the issue of the aesthetic instinct. He considers the aesthetic instinct to be the final origin of the aesthetic feeling. In this context, it is important to see that the aesthetic feeling is closely related to the aesthetic freedom that has its origin in the aesthetic instinct 9) .
6) The aesthetic instinct sheds a new light on the issue of whether aesthetic experience is disinterested. One of the traditional positions concerning this issue is that aesthetic experience is not interested 10) .
According to this position, aesthetic experience is not interested in matters of everyday life such as those related to class, sex, race, soci- produce a work of art. It is also possible for the same person to produce a work of art to serve a religious purpose and, at the same time, to earn a living. In this case, the aesthetic instinct, the religious instinct and the sensuous instinct are the driving forces that motivate the person to produce the work of art. Thus, the aesthetic instinct could work together with the other instincts. What happens to the aesthetic experience that is motivated by the aesthetic instinct, when the aesthetic instinct works together with the other instincts? There could be cases in which the other instinct(s) could oppress the working of the aesthetic instinct, and they could have a detrimental effect on the aesthetic experience. In an extreme case, the aesthetic experience could be turned into a non-aesthetic experience, and the art could change into a mere technique. However, there are also cases in which the other instinct(s) could intensify the working of the aesthetic instinct, and they could function for the aesthetic instinct in a positive way. There are endlessly many cases in which the religious zeal of an artist is the motivating force for the creation of a masterpiece.
8) The aesthetic instinct could shed a new light on the structure of the aesthetic attitude. The aesthetic attitude is an important topic for the contemporary aesthetics. In the phenomenological tradition, we have a general agreement that there is an aesthetic attitude 11) . In the analytic philosophy, however, it has been a hot issue if there is an aesthetic attitude 12) . With respect to this issue, there are conflicting positions: On the one hand, some scholars claim that there is really an aesthetic attitude 13) and, on the other hand, some scholars claim that there is no aesthetic attitude, as the title of the article "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude" 14) indicates. In my view, there really is an aes-thetic attitude, as we have the term "the aesthetic attitude" in ordinary language. Of course, it would be unfair to claim that those scholars who deny that there is aesthetic attitude have not contributed
anything. In my view, their contribution lies in having shown that the traditional theory of the aesthetic attitude is unsatisfactory. In this respect, I would like to note that, even in the phenomenological tradition, no satisfactory theory of the aesthetic attitude has been developed. This is due to the fact that the traditional phenomenological aesthetics has not attempted to clarify the genetic development of the aesthetic attitude thoroughly. In my view, the aesthetic instinct is the final genetic foundation of the aesthetic attitude. And the best way to prove that the aesthetic attitude is not a myth is to show how the aesthetic attitude is formed on the basis of the aesthetic instinct, which is, at the same time, the best way to clarify the structure of the aesthetic attitude. In this respect, I would like to point out that, like all the other instincts, the aesthetic instinct does not disappear from the field of consciousness after its first appearance, but it appears again and again and, in this way, makes it possible that the aesthetic habit is formed on the part of the person as the bearer of the aesthetic instinct. The aesthetic habit formed through the repeated function of the aesthetic instinct is an important component of the aesthetic attitude.
9) The aesthetic instinct could also shed a new light on the structure of the aesthetic world. As discussed above, Schiller touches upon the I/1; G. Dickie(1966) , "Attitude and Object: Aldrich on the Aesthetic", in: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 25/1.
issue of the aesthetic world. In this context, in Twenty Sixth Letter, dealing with the problem of the aesthetic semblance, he talks about "the world of semblance" (the Aesthetic Education, 197) that could be called the aesthetic world. This concept of the aesthetic world is an important topic for contemporary aesthetics in general, for example, for aesthetics of the phenomenological school 15) , for aesthetics of the analytic school 16) and perhaps for the other schools of aesthetics as well 17) . Unfortunately, there is no agreement about the concept of the aesthetic world between these schools. The concept of the aesthetic world is used ambiguously. Sometimes it refers to the world of artwork that is incorporated in the artwork 18) , and sometimes it is identified with the social institution 19) . The different concepts of the aesthetic world have to be separated from one another and clarified in detail. In my view, however, the concepts of the aesthetic world could not be clarified thoroughly, if we do not take into account the aesthetic instinct. The reason for this is that the aesthetic instinct is the very origin of the constitution of all the aesthetic and, in this respect, the aesthetic world is no exception.
Concluding Remarks
Taking Schiller's theory of the aesthetic instinct in the Aesthetic
Educationas the guiding point, I have tried to provide a brief sketch of the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct. I will close the discussion of the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct by making two remarks.
1) It is my task in the future to clarify in more detail the various issues of the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct sketched in section 3 and thereby to develop the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct systematically. I hope that the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct will be able to elucidate the various issues of aesthetics and consequently open a new horizon for contemporary aesthetics.
2) There are still many issues concerning the phenomenology of aesthetic instinct that were not addressed in section 3 at all. For example, there is a close relationship between the aesthetic instinct and the aesthetic rationality, and the aesthetic instinct could shed new light on the issue of aesthetic rationality. It will be my future task to deal with all the other important issues concerning the aesthetic instinct that were not mentioned in section 3. 
